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COMMENTS
GROUND RENTS - A TERM ENMESHED IN AMBIGUITY
INTRODUCTION
Though it may be thought that a survey of ground rents and their evolu-
tion is more properly an antiquarian interest, it should be recognized that
today in many states ground rents are the subject matter of conveyances and
leases and are provided for in the clauses of wills, trust agreements and title
insurance policies. The legal consequences of transactions involving ground
rents are generally well settled within a particular state jurisdiction but their
treatment from state to state is quite diverse. Perhaps, this prompted the
following dictum of Mr. justice Pitney, "we cannot say that this term
(ground rents) is the recognized equivalent of any legal estate in lands...."'
Depending upon what state jurisdiction is involved ground rents are held
to be: rent service, rent charge, a periodic rent due on a determinable fee,
and a periodic rent due on a lease. It is felt that a jurisdictional survey
according to these classifications will best clarify the meaning of the term
ground rents and will furnish us with a medium by which we can anticipate
how a document providing for a ground rent will be interpreted in a juris-
diction faced with the problem for the first time.
I. GROUND RErrTS AS RENT SERVICE
A. Pennsylvania
Beginning with the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 there was
established an estate in land called rent service. This was created when a
lord conveyed land to one of his vassals, reserving to himself the right to
call upon the tenant for services, originally military, as long as the tenant
remained the owner of the land. Gradually, rather than reserve the right of
demanding actual services of the vassals, the lords granting land began to
reserve to themselves the right to receive annually a certain sum of money.2
However, upon the failure of the tenant to tender to the lord the agreed sum,
the latter had the "seigniory right," which gave him the power of distress-
the right to go upon the vassal's land and seize the products thereof equiva-
lent to the value of the agreed sum.A
1. Camp v. Boyd, 229 U.S. 530, 554 (1913). Others have written in a similar vein.
"The meaning of ground rent is generally more misunderstood than any other term in the
science of conveyancing." 1 LADNER, CONVEYANCINC IN PENNSYLVANIA 291 (2d ed.
1941). "Ground rents are mysterious beings." Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent
-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1940).
2. 1 LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 291 (2d ed. 1941).
3. 2 BL. COMM. *42; BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 207 (1943); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH THE LAND" 188-196 (2d ed. 1947); Co. LITT.
*141b-143a; 1 LADNER, CONVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 291 (2d ed. 1941); 1 THoMP.
SON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 438 (1939); 3 TIFFANY, THE LAW
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In 1290 subinfeudation was abolished by the statute of Quia Emptores 4
so that on conveyances in fee a grantee could no longer hold of his grantor.
As a result rent service could no longer be created in England as an incident
to a fee simple conveyance. However in 1836 the Supreme Court of Penn.
sylvania, by construing the Charter granted to William Penn by King Charles
II, held that Quia Emptores was not a part of Pennsylvania law, and there-
fore, all Pennsylvania ground rents' (including those burdening fee simple
estates) were rent service. 0
In Pennsylvania a ground rent is created when the owner of the land
(called the grantor, the ground rent landlord or the covenantee) conveys land
in fee simple to a grantee, (sometimes also referred to as the terre-tenant or
covenantor,) reserving for himself the ground rent. This is done by means
of a "ground rent deed" which is executed in duplicate. One copy is re-
corded and retained by the grantor and the other marked "counterpart" is
kept by the grantee. 7 The estate of the grantor is incorporeal, being separate
and distinct from the land itself, which is a corporeal estate.s Therefore,
either estate can be subject to mortgages, the lien of a judgment and the
spouse's right of curtesy or dower.10 By custom it is expressly provided in
the standard ground rent deed that the grantee shall pay all the taxes,"
sewer and water rents, and other special assessments or charges.
Irredeemable ground rents are those payable periodically to the grantor
(his heirs or assigns) forever. Since the owners of irredeemable ground rents
demanded too great a price to extinguish them, the General Assembly legis-
lated to abolish then. 12 This act was passed under the guise of making land
more alienable by permitting the grantees to purchase them at a price to be
determined in a judicial proceeding. Because of its retroactive effect this
statute was held to be a subterfuge to aid private interests in the name of
OF REAI. PROPERTY 526-528 (3d ed., Jones, 1939). See Herr v. johnson, 11 Colo. 393,
395, 18 Pac. 342, 343 (1888); Penny v. Little, 4 111. (3 Scam.) 301, 303 (1841); Van
Rensselaer v. Jewett, 2 N.Y. 141, 151 (1849); Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 337, 347(Pa. 1836).
4. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 EDW. I, C. 1.
5. In Pennsylvania a ground rent is a sum of money reserved by a grantor of land
payable periodically (usually semi-annually) to the grantor (his heirs or assigns) for a
stated number of years or in perpetuity.
6. Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836). Before 1836 Pennsylvania cases
characterized ground rents as rent charges. Bantleon v. Smith, 2 Binney 146 (Pa. 1809);
Kunckle v. Wynick, 1 Dal. 326 (Pa. 1788). For other cases see CADWALADER, THE LAw
OF GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 71-75 (1879).
7. 1 LADNER, CONVEYA'JCINC IN PENNSYLVANIA 291-292, 297 (2d ed. 1941).
8. Irwin v. The Bank of The United States, I Pa. 349 (1845).
9. Hart v. Anderson, 198 Pa. 558, 48 At. 636 (1901).
10. This lien does not attach if the other spouse expressly relinquishes the right to
curtesy or dower at the time the property is conveyed. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.5
(1952).
11. At present this deed expressly exempts the garntee from paying income taxes due
on the ground rents received by the grantor. Without such a provision the tax covenant
has been held to obligate the grantee to pay the income tax. Ehrlich v. Brogan, 262 Pa.
362, 105 Atl. 511 (1918).
12. Act of Assembly, Apr. 15, 1869. P.L. 1869.
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the public and therefore a taking of property without due process of law.'3
To overcome this objection new legislation was adopted which provided that
all ground rents created subsequently would be redeemable.14  The redeem-
able ground rent differs from the irredeemable variety in that the grantee can
have it extinguished by payment of the principal at any time after its due
date which cannot be for more than twenty-one years (or a life or lives in
being). The ground rent itself cannot exceed the legal rate of interest pre-
vailing at the time of the creation of the ground rent. The grantor can
never demand the principal, except after its due date or on default of the
periodic ground rent payment; however, these exceptions must be expressly
provided for (as has been customary in recent years) in the ground rent
deed."'
The right of distress as an incident of the ground rent' 7 was modified
in Vallace v. Harmstad5 to be permitted only if there is an express reserva-
tion providing for it in the ground rent deed."' If the land, out of which a
ground rent landlord collects the rent, is divided the landlord need not recog-
nize the apportionment, but can hold the original terre-tenant liable,2 how-
ever, the original tenant has a right of action against his assignees who are
13. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479 (1871).
14. This act was made effective as of June 24, 1885, the date it became law. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 162 (1952).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 162 (1952).
16. Crean's Estate, 321 Pa. 216, 183 Atl. 915 (1936).
17. This was recognized because the Pennsylvania ground rent is rent service to which
distress attached as a matter of right. See Kenege v. Elliott, 9 Watts 258, 262 (Pa. 1840);
Ingrsoll v. Sergeant, I Whart. 337, 347, 352 (Pa. 1836).
18. 44 Pa. 492 (1863).
19. The theory of this case was that distress was not an incident of rent service in
Pennsylvania because tenure did not exist there. This holding has been vehemently criti-
cized on the grounds that Tent service can only exist when there is tenure. CAOWVALADER,
7HE LAW OF GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 50 (1879); GRAY, Inz RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES 24 (4th ed., Gray, 1942); Vance, The Quest for Tenure in the United
States, 33 YALE L.J., 248, 262 (1924); Note, 5 TEMP. L.O. 279, 283 (1931). As a
practical matter the objections to Wallace v. Haristad have Teen overcome by the stand-
ard provisions in ground rent deeds which provide that: the grantor shall be authorized
to distrain should the grantee default in his ground rent payments; the grantee shall pay
a constable's fee of ten per cent based on the distrained goods and a five per cent attor-
ney's fee based on the principal and interest of the ground rent; the grantee shall pay a
two hundred fifty dollar attorney's fee for any action at law that stems from his hreaeh
of any provision of the ground rent deed; and that the grantee waives the provisions of
'IThe Exemption Act of 1849 and "any other Act of Assembly now or hereafter passed".
The Exemption Act of 1849 exempted property up to three hundred dollars from levy
and sale on execution and distress for rent. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2161-2162; 2164-
2165 (1952). However, the provisions of this act with regard to exemption from execu-
tion and distress for rent were repealed on April 6, 1951 by The Landlord and Tenant
Act of 1951. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250,401 (1952). Since the grantee's covenant
waiving The Exemption Act of 1849 and "any other Act of Assembly now or hereafter
passed" is extensive it would probably be construed to include the provisions of the 1951
Act relating to exemption from execution and distress for rent. However, in view of the
maxim that "a deed is construed strictly against the grantor" the cautious grantor will
insist that the grantee specifically waive, in an additional covenant, the exemption provi-
sions of The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951.
20. The Ministers, Trustees, etc., of German Lutheran Congregation v. Limehouse,
19 D.R.; 199 (C.P. no. 5, Phila. County, Pa., 1910).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the other tenants of the apportioned land.2 1 If the landlord extinguishes the
ground rent obligation of one parcel of divided land subject to a ground rent,
the owners of the other parcels are not relieved of their obligation to pay the
remaining share of the ground rent assessment. 22 Should the tenant default
in his ground rent payments the grantor can bring an action of assumpsit 2a
against him or his assignee.24 However, on ground rents reserved since June
12, 1878, assignees are not liable to the ground rent landlord unless they
personally assume such liability in writing;25 but if the original ground rent
was created before June 12, 1878, they are personally liable even though they
became assignees after that date.20
The land subject to a ground rent may be used to satisfy a judgment for
back rents due the grantor, but neither the estate of the grantee nor his per-
sonal representative is liable for any deficiency even though the deceased
may have assumed personal liability for the ground rents during his lifetime.2 1
Another remedy usually provided for in the ground rent deed in case of de-
fault by the grantee is the obsolete and cumbersome right of re-entry (rarely
used today). The more common method to achieve this end is the action
of ejectment.28 In Pennsylvania it is a common practice for those who
purchase land subject to a ground rent to take title of the property as an
assignee of a straw man20 and thereby avoid the personal liability that would
otherwise attach if title were taken directly from the ground rent landlord. 0
In the event that a ground rent is owned by several persons the terre-tenant is
individually liable to each for the payment of the portion of the ground rent
due them.31
A ground rent may be extinguished through merger by a conveyance of
it to the grantee owning the land that is encumbered by the ground rent.82
A conclusive presumption as to its extinguishment or release arises when no
payment, claim, demand or declaration on a ground rent shall have been
made for twenty-one years. 83
21. Lennox v. Brower, 160 Pa. 191, 28 Atl. 839 (1894). Cf. May's Estate, 218 Pa.
64, 67 Atl. 120 (1907).
22. Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836).
23. Originally covenant was brought; but the statute consolidating the forms of action
merged covenant into assumpsit. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1 (1952).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 211 (1952); Loner v. Hummel, 21 Pa. 450 (1853).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 655-656 (1952); Easby v. Easby, Ex'rs, 180 Pa. 429,
36 AtI. 923 (1897).
26. Sachse v. Myers, 15 Pa. Super. 425 (1900).
27. Williams's Appeal, 47 Pa. 283 (1864); Qnain's Appeal, 22 Pa. 510 (1854).
28. 1 LADNR , CONv YANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA 301-302 (2d ed. 1941).
29. A straw man is one who is hopelessly insolvent, and therefore, is quite willing to
assume a contingent liability for an extremely small consideration. Only in the miracu-
lous event that the straw man becomes the recipient of a "windfall" is it theoretically
possible that his judgment creditors could be satisfied.
30. Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia Record Co., 302 Pa. 370, 153
At. 684 (1931).
31. Reed v. Ward, 22 Pa. 144 (1853).
32. Frank v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 216 Pa. 40, 64 Atl. 894 (1906).
33. Clay, Adm'r v. Iseminger, 187 Pa. 108, 41 Atl. 38 (1898). PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 80 (1952), Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902) (this statute is not an act
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B. Delaware
It appears that Ouia Eiptores 4 is not recognized in Delaware as that
state was a part of Pennsylvania till 1702; and therefore, rent service can be
created on a conveyance in fee simple.a5  On the other hand it has been
asserted that Delaware was outside-the patent from the Duke of York to
William Penn and consequently, Quia Emptores is a part of Delaware law.3
However, neither the Dclaware statutes nor the Delaware cases31 involving
ground rent appear to suggest that Quia Emptores is a part of Delaware law
nor seem to prevent the reservation of irredeemable ground rents on fee sim-
ple conveyances. Redeemable ground rents are recognized and the legislature
has authorized the Superior Court of Delaware to issue a writ of scire facias
against any grantor who fails to extinguish or release a ground rent on pay-
ment of the principal,"
C. Maryland
The Maryland ground rent which has been held to be rent service" is
in some ways akin to its "cousin", the Pennsylvania ground rent, but differs
in several vital aspects. In Maryland a ground rent consists of a sum of
money periodically40 received by the owner of real property in return for his
leasing it for a given number of years4' coupled with an option in the lessee
(his heirs or assigns) to perpetually renew the lease upon its termination by
payment of a nominal "renewal fine." 42  The distinctive characteristics of
the Maryland ground rent reflect its indigenous growth and, though its exact
origin is unknown, it has been theorized that the familiarity of many early
Maryland settlers with their native Irish long term leases, 3 coupled with the
then prevalent feeling that the statute of Quia Emptores" was part of
Maryland law, gave rise to the Maryland ground rent.45
or law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of U. S. CONsT. ART. I,
§ 10).
34. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 EDw. 1, c. 1.35. CADWALADER, TuE LAw OF GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 111 (1879).36. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETuiriEs 25 (4th ed., Gray, 1942).
37. Brown v. Pierce, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 326, 99 At]. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Dougherty,
Ex'rs v. Flemming, 23 Del. (7 Penn.) 278, 79 Ati. 104 (Super. Ct. 1908).
38. DEL. REV. CODE C. 5060-5062 § 75-77 (1935).
39. Ehrman v. Mayer, 57 Md. 612 (1882).'
40. Ground rents are usually payable semi-annually, although occasionally some ground
rent leases provide for annual or quarter-annual payment.
41. It is generally provided that a ground rent lease shall be for ninety-nine years,
however, leases for 9,999 years have been created. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent
--Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L, REv. 1, 7 21n (1940).
42. "Renewal fines" generally varv from one to ten dollars. They are rarely paid and
in effect are merely a fiction. However, it has been asserted that should property subject
to a ground rent lease depreciate in value the lessee could with impunity forfeit his lease
at its expiration by failing to pay the "renewal fine." Kaufman, The Maryland Ground
Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 NI. L. REv. 1, 17-19 (1940). But if the lessee pays
the ground rent for the hundredth year in a ninety-nine year lease, renewable forever, the
"renewal fine" is conclusively presumed to be paid. Mo. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 21,
§ 114 (1951).
43. See Culbreth, Adm'x v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 458-459, 16 Atl. 112, 116 (1888);
Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207, 214 (1876).
44. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 Eow. I, c. 1.
45. The consensus still isthat Quia Emptores is part of Maryland law. Chestnut,
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Tle owner of real property creates a ground rent by leasing his land,
usually for ninety-nine years, 40 renewable forever. The rent reserved to the
landlord constitutes the ground rent which is redeemable. Before 1884
irredeemable ground rents could be created in Maryland. They consisted of
those which the lessee had a right to retain forever, and as a result lessors
habitually charged exorbitant consideration to extinguish them. Therefore,
in 1884 the Maryland legislature provided that henceforth all ground rents
would be redeemable at the option of the lessee. 47 This legislation has been
favorably received48 and is similar to the action of the Pennsylvania General
Assembly in abolishing, irredeemable ground rents in that state. However,
irredeemable ground rents created before 1884 are unaffected by this act be-
cause it would be "in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution."49 Under existing law ground rents on a leasehold for ninety-
nine years or more, renewable forever, may be redeemed after five years by
the lessee paying the amount of the yearly rent capitalized at an amount not
exceeding six per cent. The estate of the lessor is realty, but that of the
lessee is personalty5° and not subject to dowerY1
In Maryland the ground rent lease usually provides that the lessor shall
have: the right to distrain all the chattels found on the premises at any time
that the rents shall be partially or wholly in arrears; the right of re-entry
when the ground rent is either partly or wholly unpaid for sixty days or long-
er; and the right to deem the lease null and void if any part of the rent is in
arrears for six months or longer. However, the mortgagee of a lessee may file a
bill in equity within six months after execution and gain possession of the
leasehold by performing all the covenants of the lessee in addition to paying
all costs and damages sustained by the lessorY2  Most ground rent leases also
provide that the lessee shall pay all the taxes and assessments on the property
The Effect of Quia EmPtores on Pennsylvania and Maryland Ground Rents, 91 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 137, 142-147 (1942); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed.,
Gray, 1942). It appears that this view nurtured the device of the long terni lease renew-
able forever as an alternative to achieve practically the same effect as the perpetual rant
service on a fee simple conveyance which was used in Pennsylvania where Quia Emptores
was declared not part of its law. See Jones v. Magruder, 42 F. Supp. 193, 196-197 (D.
Md. 1941). But see Note, Maryland Statutory Modifications of the Law of Real Prop-
erty, I MD. L. REV. 238 (1937) (Quia Emptores is not a part of Maryland law).
46. See note 41, supra.
47. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art. 21, § 111 (1951), Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md.
242, 16 Atd. 644 (1889).
48. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L.
REv. 1, 42-16 (1940).
49. See Marburg v. Mercantile Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 438, 443-444, 140 Atl. 836, 839
(1928).
50. Culbreth, Adm'r v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 16 At]. 112 (1888); Arthur v. Cole, 56
Md. 100 (1881); Taylor v. Taylor, 47 Md. 295 (1877). But cf. Jones v. Magruder, 42
F. Supp, 193 (D. Md. 1941) (a leasehold interest subject to a ground rent is real prop-
erty within the purview of the Documentary Tax Act requiring federal revenue stamps to
be affixed on deeds transferring realty). For a cogent presentation of the view that the
Documentary Tax Act does not apply to leaseholds subject to the Maryland ground rent
see Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland Ground Rents, 3 MD. L. REv. 314, 334-335 (1939).
51. Spangler v. Stanler, I Md. Ch. 36 , 1847).
52. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 75, § 78 (1951).
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subject to the ground rent. If the lessor is tax-exempt the lessee can be
taxed on an assessment based on the value of the leasehold interest only.53
However, if the lessee is tax-exempt, and the lessor is not, it has been the
practice in Maryland not to tax the property; but it has been asserted that
the lessee should pay the taxes on the value of the reversionary interest of
the lessor on the basis of "performing a contractual obligation with a third
party."54
The lessee may mortgage his leasehold interest. 55 The lessee of a ground
rent lease may assign his entire leasehold interest, but he still remains person-
ally liable for all his covenants to the lessor if the assignee defaults. 56 How-
ever, the third party assignee is only liable for his covenants during the period
he is in possession of the leasehold even though the fourth party to whom
he assigns his interest defaults. 7 As a result it is the general practice in
Maryland (as in Pennsylvania) for a prospective lessee of a ground rent
leasehold to take mediately of his lessor as an assignee of a straw man. 5
Ground rents may be extinguished in Maryland by forfeiture for breach of
covenant, merger, adverse possession, redemption and estoppel.59
D. South Carolina
Although the statute of Quia Emptores 0 has been held to be inopera-
tive in Pennsylvania"' and would probably not be recognized in Delaware 2
it has been generally held to be in effect throughout the United States, as
part of the common law. Therefore, in the majority of states real property
owned in fee simple cannot be subject to rent service. A possible exception
appears to be South Carolina where Quia Emptores is not recognized.63
53. Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City, 50 Md. 397
(1879).
54. Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland Ground Rents, 3 MD. L. REV. 314, 320 (1939).
55. The standard leasehold mortgage covenant provides that the mortgagor shallpay all the rents, assessments and taxes due on the property and that he shall be deemedin default upon his failure to so perform. If the mortgagor defaults the mortgagee auto-
matically acquires the right to possession and thus becomes in privity of estate with the
owner of the reversionary interest in the land and is liable to him for the payment of all
future ground rents, assessments and taxes provided for in the ground rent lease. Tius,
many mortgages including federal agencies such as the [Tome Owners Loan Corporation(HOLC), organized to provide emergency relief to home owners and assist them with
respect to home mortgage indebtedness, were caught unawares, and upon default of the
mortgagor found themselves the reluctant obligors of ground rent owners. As a result
this rule encountered strong criticism. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysteri-
ous but Beneficial, 5 MD. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1940); Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland
Ground Rents, 3 Mn, L. REV. 314, 321-323 (1939).
56. The Consumers' Ice Co. v. William 1-1. 11. Bixler & Co., 84 Md. 437, 35 AtI.1086 (1896).57. Reid v. John F. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co. of Baltimore, 88 Md. 234, 40 AtI.
877 (1898); Donelson v. Polk, 64 Md. 501, 2 Atl. 824 (1886); llintze v. Thomas, 7 Md.346 1855).
X For a definition of a straw man, see note 29, supra.
59. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L.
REv. 1, 46 (1940).
60. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 1290, 18 EDW. I, C. 1.
61. Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836).
62. CADWALADEE, THE LAw OF GRoUrD RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 111 (1879).
63. CRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITlES 25 (4th ed., Gray, 1942); Vance, TheQuest for Tenure in The United States, 33 YALE L.J. 248, 268 (1924).
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Thus, it is theoretically possible that irredeemable ground rents in the nature
of rent service will be upheld there. There are no reported cases regarding
rent service in South Carolina but it. has been stated that "they may once
have existed in the early feudal days [circa 1750]. ''64 However, it seems un-
likely that ground rents would be permitted today in South Carolina in view
of the hesitancy of courts to recognize segments of the ancient common
law that have been ignored for centuries in the jurisdiction.
E. Other Jurisdictions
The statute of Quia Emptores did not prohibit the creation of rent
service on estates of less than fee simple if the reversion was held by the
grantor.15 However the courts of Colorado 0 and Illinois 67 have announced
that rent service cannot be recognized because fealty does not exist in the
United States. The theory of these decisions has been criticized 8 but other
courts would probably rech the same result on grounds of "public policy"
based on the theory that in a modern society courts should disregard archaic
parts of the common law.
II. GROUND RENTS AS RENT CHARGE
A. Virginia
In Virginia a ground rent is a valid, but uncommon, interest in real
property. It is created by a conveyance of land to a grantee reserving a
ground rent which is the specified sum of money covenanted to be paid
periodically in perpetuity to the grantor (his heirs or assigns)."" The Vir-
ginia ground rent is regarded as a rent charge,70 The common law rent
charge is a reservation of a rent on a conveyance of land, usually in fee
simple, but unlike rent service it cannot be apportioned nor does it carry the
right of distress unless specifically provided for in the deed.7' The reserva-
tion of the ground rent constitutes the sole consideration for the conveyance
and provision is usually made for an option in the grantee to redeem the
land from the ground rent upon payment of a specified sum after a certain
number of years. 2 Most Virginia ground rents are, therefore, similar to the
Pennsylvania redeemable ground rent (which is rent service). However, un-
64. CALWALADER, THE LAW oF GROUND RENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 111 (1879).
65. Ehrman v. Mayer, 57 Md. 612 (1882). See Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cow. 652, 656-
657 (N.Y. 1824).
66. Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 18 Pac. 342 (1888).
67. Penny v. Little, 4 111. (3 Scam.) 301 (1841).
68. Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial, 5 MD. L. REV.
1, 4 Sn (1940); 3 TIFFANY, H'E LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 528-529 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
69. Willis's Ex'r v. Virginia, 97 Va. 667, 34 S.E. 460 (1899).
70. Ibid.; Wartenby v. Moran, 7 Va. (3 Call) 491 (1803).
71. 2 BL. COMM. *42; CLARA, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICii "RUN
WITH THE LAND" 188-196 (2d ed. 1947); Co. LITT. *143b-150a; 1 THOMPSON, COM-
MENTARIES ON TUE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 438-439 (1939). In England and Ireland
the rent charge has also been denominated ground rents. 180 L.T. 231 (1935); 67 IR.
L.T. 281 (1933). The common law rent charge should be distinguished from the Lou-
isiana rent charge which is derived from the civil law. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2779-2792
(1952). It has been referred to as a ground rent. See New Orleans v. Camp, 105 La.
288. 290, 29 So. 340, 341 (1901).
72. Willis's Ex'r v. Virginia, 97 Va. 667, 34 S.E. 460 (1899).
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like the law of Pennsylvania 73 it still seems possible for one to create an
irredeemable ground rent in Virginia. The grantor is expressly provided with
the rights of distress and re-entry should the grantee default in his ground
rent payments.74  The ground rent itself is an incorporeal hereditament sub-
ject to the incidents of real property such as curtesy and dower, and it cannot
be taxed as personalty.75 Taxes on land subject to a ground rent are assessed
against the grantee.76 No action may be brought on a ground rent obliga-
tion for which payment to the owner thereof has not been made ten years
after such ground rent became due and payable."
B. Other Jurisdictions
Other states have recognized rent charges8 even though they have not
been referred to as ground rents. However the recent dictum of Judge
James Alger Fee, that "ground rents (apparently meaning rent charges) have
no place in the law of Oregon because the customs of the people have not
called for the creation of such incidents,"79 may foreshadow a movement by
the courts in the United States to hold such interests in land unrecogniz-
able, especially in those jurisdictions contemplating a case involving rent
charges for the first time.
III. GROUND RENTS AS A PERIODIC RENT DUE ON A DETERMINABLE FEE
Georgia and Ohio
There exists in Georgia and Ohio a unique type of ground rent that
clouds an estate which at first blush appears to be a fee simple determin-
able.80 This ground rent is created when one conveys land reserving to him-
self (his heirs and assigns) a stipulated amount of money called the ground
rent, usually to be paid quarter annually forever; but the grantee may be re-
lieved of the burden of the ground rent by the lump sum payment of a
stated sum of money. The deed further provides that if a specified number
of days elapse after the quarter annual ground rent becomes due then the
premises shall revert to the grantor, who shall possess a right of re-entry to
divest the grantee of all his interest in the land.8' However, if the grantor
exercises the right of re-entry and sells the land to a third party, equity will
force him to disgorge to the original grantee all the profits gained by the
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 162 (1952).
74. Wartenby v. Moran, 7 Va. (3 Call) 491 (1803).
75. Willis's Ex'r v. Virginia, 97 Va. 667, 34 S.E. 460 (1899).
76. Ibid.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 5817 (1950). This statute changed the common law
that actions on ground rents are not barred by lapse of time. Mulliday v. Machir's Adm'r,
45 Va. (4 Cratt.) 1 (1846).
78. Herner v. Dellinger, 18 Fed. 495 (C.C.E.D. Wisc. 1883): Bartos, Adm'r v.
Skleba, 107 Nebr. 293, 185 N.W. 1002 (1921) (rent charge held apportionable); Farley
v. Craig, 11 N.J. Eq. 262 (1830). See Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. 596, 598 (1825).
79. United States v. Florea, 68 F. Supp. 367, 373 (D. Oreg. 1945).
80 A fee simple determinable estate is one granted in perpetuity, but subject to a
specific prohibition which, if violated, terminates the estate and automatically re-vests title
in the grantor. The estate of the grantor is called a possibility of reverter. First Univer-
salist Society of North America v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892).
81. Laurence v. Savannah, 71 Ga. 392 (1883); Swoll v. Oliver, 61 Ga. 248 (1878);
Stephenson v. Haines, 16 Ohio St. 478 (1866).
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grantor over the amount due on the land.82  Both estates are realty; that of
the grantor being an incorporeal hereditament, but the estate of the grantee
is corporeal and he must pay all the taxes assessed on the property. 3
IV. GROUND RENTS AS A PERIODIC RENT ON A LEASE
A number of jurisdictions have recognized the use of the term ground
rent in a less technical sense than the states discussed in the foregoing para-
graphs. In this sense ground rent usually means a rent payable periodically
to the lessor of unimproved land for a specified number of years. The lessee
is given the right to improve the property and must pay all the taxes and
assessments attaching thereto. Cases so using the expression ground rent are
found in the following American jurisdictions: Connecticut,8 4 District of
Columbia, 5 Maine, 0 New York, 7 Rhode Island,88 Washington"9 and Wis-
consin.9 0 Recently the Supreme Court of Rhode Island acknowledged that
the term ground rent could be so used, but frowned upon its use in this
sense which it regarded as "misnomers of a kind not uncommon among lay-
men in speaking of rights and interests in real property and of the devolu-
tion thereof." 9' Attorneys and conveyancers should avoid the use of the
expression "ground rent" as meaning the rent payable periodically on a lease
in jurisdictions where the term is not so used as other courts may show a
similar hostility to the use of the expression.
CONCLUSION
The multitude of cases involving ground rents demonstrate that the term
is one of varied meanings from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Scrupulous
82. Laurence v. Savannah, 71 Ga. 392 (1883); Stephenson v. Haines, 16 Ohio St.
478 (1866). Except for this rule giving the grantee equitable relief this estate subject
to a ground rent is identical to the fee simple estate subject to a condition subsequent
which is one giving the grantor power to terminate it by use of the right of entry upon
the happening of a specific event. Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N.Y. 100 (1859).
MOYNIHAN, PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF TIlE LAw OF REAL PROPERT 19 (1940). But cf.
Penick Ex'r v. Atkinson, 139 Ga. 649, 71 S.E. 1055 (1913) (the estate subject to a
ground rent called base or determinable fee). In Florida landowners should avoid convey.
ancing in fee subject to a ground rent with a right of re-entry in the grantor if payment
is not made because after the twenty-first year the right of re-entry would probably be
declared void under a recent statute limiting most possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry to twenty-one years. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951). Stephenson, Constitutional
Inviolability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry in Florida, 6 MIAMI L.Q.
162 (1952).
83. Penick, Ex'r v. Atkinson, 139 Ga. 649, 77 S.E. 1055 (1913); Wells v. Savannah,
87 Ga. 397, 13 S.E. 442 (1891), aff'd, 181 U.S. 531 (1901); Stephenson v. Haines, 16
Ohio St. 478 (1866). k-
84. Russell, Receiver v. New Haven, 51 Conn. 259 (1883) (in addition lessee obtains
title to all buildings he erects on the land, but the lessor has the right to purchase them).
85. Prout v. Roby, 15 Wall, 471 (U.S. 1872); Willard v. Taylor, 8 Wall. 557 (U.S.
1869) (lessee also given right to discharge property of ground rent by payment of a
specific sum).
86. Gale v. Edwards, 52 Me. 363 (1864).
87. Application of Flushingside Realty & Construction Co., 186 Misc. 117, 59 N.Y.S.
2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
88. Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. Green, 74 R.I. 153, 59 A.2d 356 (1948).
89. Monidah Trust v. Arctic Construction Co., 156 Wash. 630, 287 Pac. 898 (1930).
90. Marshall & llsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wise. 415, 250 NW. 862
(1933).
91. Iladley Falls Trust Co. v. Green, 74 R.I. 153, 160, 59 A.2d 356, 359-360 (1948).
COMMENTS
attorneys should, therefore, avoid this expression unless it is used in con-
junction with other descriptive words that give it a definite meaning.,"
Otherwise, litigation that could have been avoided may ensue to unravel the
meaning posed by the use of the term ground rent in a document. 3
CHARLES B. SLOANE.
PROPER SUBJECTS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER
FEDERAL LEGISLATION .
The subjects of collective bargaining are numerous and varied. Those
generally accepted by both labor and management as proper subjects include
the following: wage rates, hours of employment, overtime, discharge, sus-
pension, layoff, recalls, seniority, discipline, promotion, transfer, plant safety
and sanitation together with protection of health in the place af employment.'
On the other hand other subjects are usually considered to be the sole
prerogative of management and therefore not proper subjects of collective
bargaining. Those subjects in this category usually include the corporate or
other structure of the business, the location of plants, production schedules,
the number and personnel of the official and supervisory force, and processes
and means of manufacturing. 2
Having already achieved, to a great extent, the direct benefits of proper
wages, reasonable hours and healthful working conditions, union efforts re-
cently have been and continue to be directed to matters which yield indirect
benefits that could aptly be described as fringe issues. These subjects have
caused much litigation before the National Labor Relations Board3 and in
federal courts. In the main, management has contended that such matters
92. A provision in a trust agreement providing for the investment in "ground rents" is
as indefinite as a provision to invest in "real property." A carefully worded provision
might state: "The trustee shall have the power to buy and sell only such irredeemable
ground rents as exist incident to land in Pennsylvania and that are recognized by the law
of Pennsylvania and which yield not less than four per cent interest at the time of purchase
by the trustee. Furthermore the irredeemable ground rent must expressly provide that
the owner thereof shall have the rights of distress and re-entry should there be a default
in the payment of the ground rent. The trustee shall not have the power to purchase any
irredeemable ground rent that is encumbered by a mortgage, judgment or any other lien
whatsoever."
It is the practice of some title companies to insure the title of the grantee except
for such "encumbrances or ground rents" as exist against the land, As all ground rents
are encumbrances of land this statement adequately protects the title company; but the
grantee should be cautioned to check against all types of ground rents to ascertain to what
extent his property is covered by the title insurance policy.
93. Camp v. Byrd, 229 U.S. 530 (1913) ("ground rent" held to include the reversion-
ary interest); Moran v. Hlammersla, 188 Md. 382, 52 A.2d 727 (1947) (ground rent
agreement too indefinite to permit specific performance).
1. 1 CCH LAB. LAw REP. § 3020.
2. Ibid.
3. Hereinafter the National Labor Relations Board will be referred to simply as the
board.
